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NOTES AND COMMENT

resentatives of a deceased, his heirs or estate." The policy in suit
was not so made; it being made payable to "Cohen and Kirsner, a
partnership, its successors or assigns."
Thus the only logical conclusion for the court to come to was that the
avails of the insurance policy were held by the administratrix as part
of the general assets of the estate of Charles W. Cohen, deceased,
subject to claims of creditors, and not distributable to his heirs at law.
AL H. HURLEY
Intoxicating Liquors: Searches and Seizures.
In the case of Fabri v. United States (24 Fed. (2d) 185), a prohibition agent searched the residence of Fabri under authority of a
search warrant, which he assumed to be valid, and seized and took
away quantities of various liquors. Upon his arrest Fabri appeared
and filed a verified petition, assailing the validity of the warrant,
praying that it be quashed and the evidence so obtained suppressed
and that the seized property be ordered returned to him at his home.
In the petition he alleges only that he was in possession, and not that
he was in the lawful possession of the property. Upon a hearing
the court below ordered the warrant quashed and the evidence suppressed, but denied the prayer for a return of the property. Defendant sued out a writ of error, which is directed to the part of the
order denying him a return of the seized property.
The court held that "where upon an unlawful search of a dwelling
house, government agents seize property, the possession of which may
or may not have been unlawful, the person from whose possession it is
wrongfully taken is prima facie entitled to its restoration, and that the
government can make successful resistance to an appropriate petition
for its return only by showing affirmatively, by proofs other than those
obtained as a result of the unlawful search, that the property was,
at the time of seizure, being used in the commission of crime."
Upon the, general question of the duty of the courts to order the
return of liquor wrongfully seized by government agents in the course
of an unlawful search, there is hopeless conflict in the federal courts.
In arriving at its conclusion this court said, "Possession of liquor
in a dwelling house may be lawful or unlawful, depending upon the
mode of acquisition or the intended use," and "Unless we resort to
the facts disclosed by the search there is no ground at all on which
to invoke the presumption of section 33 of the National Prohibition
Act (41 Stat. 317; U.S.C.A. No. 50.)."
EUGENE M. HAERTLE
Larceny, Bailment, Misappropriation of Funds by a Broker.
Section 343.17, Statutes, among other things provides that "Whoever being a bailee of any chattel, money or valuable security shall
fraudulently take or fraudulently convert the same to his own use or
to the use of any person other than the owner thereof .... shall be
guilty of larceny."
A bailment "is a delivery of goods in trust, upon an agreement expressed or implied, that the trust shall be duly exercised, and the
goods returned or delivered over when the purpose of the bailment
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is accomplished."' In every bailment the possession of the thing bailed
is in the bailee while the ownership remains in the bailor. There is
an agreement between the bailor and bailee upon which we may predicate a contractual relation.2 These elementary principles must be kept
in mind in order to try and understand the decision of the Supreme
Court of Illinois in the case of People v. Wildeman.' An interesting
Wisconsin case which might aid in the solution of the problem presented, is Burns v. State,4 to which we shall later advert.

The facts of the Illinois case were briefly these:
Wildeman was engaged in the business of selling bonds in the city
of Chicago. Through one of his employees he sold to the complaining witness a $500 bond in April, 1924.

Later he wrote the com-

plaining witness that the bond she had purchased had gone down in
value and suggested that she change or sell it. In response to a letter
she came to his office and turned the bond over to him, and was told
that he would attempt to get a different bond in its place, and sometime later she replied that whatever he decided in the matter would
be satisfactory to her.

Shortly after December 20, 1925, the office

furniture and property of the defendant were sold under an execution,
and his bank account garnisheed. A few days later defendant was
arrested on the charge of larceny as bailee. He testified that he sold
the bond and placed the funds in his account in the bank and owing
to the closing of his business he was unable to negotiate for another
bond. The only question in the case was whether the defendant
had committed the crime of larceny as bailee. Was he a bailee in a
strict sense of the word?
The Court says: "In order that such an offense exists there must
be a bailment and relation of bailor and bailee."
Clearly the defendant cannot be convicted unless he was a bailee of
the complainant witnesses' bond. In order that there be a bailment,
the identical thing must be returned by the bailee when the trust is
over; for example, if A deposits a $5 bill with B in an envelope
with the understanding that he is to get that $5 bill back in the envelope, the relationship is a bailment; but, if A merely deposits the
$5 and is willing to receive back five other dollars, the bank becomes
A's debtor and not a bailee. The defendant was a broker with authority
to sell a bond and get another in its place; then, clearly, there cannot be a bailment relation created because the identical bond was not
to be returned. The rule is of universal application that the same
identical thing in either its original or an altered form,5 must be returned. But here, no such relation was created by the acts of the
parties. The writer believes that the Court (although it seemingly
decided against the weight of authority) properly held that there was
no bailment and hence defendant could not be convicted of larceny
as bailee. The Court construed the relation to be one of debtor and
'Cooley on Torts, page 631.
Elliott on Contract, pgr. 2985.
3325 Illinois 99, 156 N.E. 257, 52 A.L.R. 500.
4 145 Wis. 373, 128 N.W.
987.
G5
Cyc. 199.
2 Vide
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creditor and cited the cases of Whetherell v. O'Brien, Chickering v.
Bastress,7 Richardson v. Olmnstead, and Longergan v. Stewart,' to
support its contentions.
The Court in construing the criminal statute, which resembles our
own Section 343.17, says: "There must, however, in any event, be a
bailment in order that the relationship of bailee exists. There is no
bailment here, and therefore no bailee or larceny as bailee. The relationship existing between plaintiff in error and the complaining witness is that of debtor and creditor."
In the case of Burns v. State, supra, the Court held that a person
picking up money that was thrown away by an insane individual
became a bailee of the money and when he converted it, he could be
prosecuted under the statutes for the crime of larceny as bailee. The
two cases are easily distinguishable; in the Wisconsin case, the person picking up the money had to return the same money to the bailor;
in the Illinois case, the broker had no such duty imposed upon him
by his contractual engagement.
An extended annotation on the "relation between customer and broker
receiving bonds or other securities for sale or exchange" can be found
in 52 A.L.R. 501.
SAM GOLDENBERG

Master and Servant; Workmen's Compensation Act; Indemnity
to Permanently Disabled Minor Employee.
"Proper administration of the Workmen's Compensation Act requires appreciation of the manifest legislative purpose thereof, i.e., to
abolish the common law system of compensating injured employees as
unsuitable to modern conditions and conceptions of moral obligations,
and substitute therefor one based on the highest present conception of
man's humnnity to man and obligations to the employee class."'
The instant case 2 presents an interpretation of a heretofore unconstrued provision contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act,
which interpretation serves to carry out the above quoted purpose.
In brief substance, the facts of the case are these: the defendant in
this action (plaintiff below) a minor, was permanently disabled while
in the employ of the appellant, and was awarded a weekly compensation of $22.50 under the following provision:

"If an employee is a minor and is permanently disabled, his weekly
earnings on which to compute the indemnity accruing to him for permanent disability shall be determined on the basis of the earnings that
such minor, if not disabled, probably would earn after attaining the age
of twenty-one years. Unless otherwise established his earnings shall
be taken as equivalent13 to the amount upon which maximum weekly
indemnity is payable."
a140

Ill. 146, 333 Am. St. Rep.

221,

29 N.E. 9o4.

' 130 II1. 2o6, 17 Am. St. Rep. 309, 22 N.E. 542.

$74 Ill.
213.

955 Ill.
44.
'City of Milwaukee v. Miller, 354 Wis. 652.
'Badger Carton Co. v. Industrial ComMnIsiolt of Wisconsh, 218 N.W. 19o,
- Wis -.
' Section io.1, sub section i, Wis. R.S., 1925.

